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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
EVIDENCE
ANOTHER EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE
Plaintiff, after being discharged as a chauffeur-carrier of United
States mail, sued the government to recover sums which had been
deducted from his salary for the purpose of establishing a pension.
Defendant entered and established a counterclaim for money which
plaintiff had taken from the mail and which had resulted in claims
against the post office department. Alleging that the affidavits of
alive and physically capable people upon which the counterclaim was
based were inadmissible as hearsay evidence,' plaintiff appealed.
Held, affidavits admissible; defendant made out a pima facie case.2
The hearsay rule of evidence is a rule excluding assertions of-
fered testimonially which cannot in some way be subjected to the
test of cross-examination.$ This rules has been zealously guarded.4
Nevertheless, some exceptions, most of them based upon necessity and
circumstantial probability of trustworthiness, have developed.5 Thus,
courts have held that death of the declarant 6 or his physical incapac-
ity 7 is sufficient cause to admit his statements as exceptions to the
hearsay rule, provided that there is some guarantee of reliability.8
In holding that the great expense of bringing the many declar-
ants or their depositions before the court made them unavailable and
'These were claims against the post office department of losses of
66 items of C. 0. D. and insured parcels post mailed to addressees
on plaintiff's route from various parts of the country. Each
affidavit contained (1) a declaration' by the initial postmaster
that the parcel had been received, (2) a declaration by the post-
master at the point of destination that there was no record of its
delivery, (3) affidavits by sender of contents of parcel and their
value, and (4) affidavits of addressee of its non-receipt.
2 Boerner v. United States, 117 F. (2d) 387 (C.C.A. 2d, 1941), cert.
denied, 313 U. S. 587 (1941). Several other points were involved,
but this note limits itself to the issue of hearsay evidence.
3 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 1362.
4 See Queen v. Hepburn, 7 Cranch 290 (U. S. 1813), 294 to 297, where
Chief Justice Marshall discusses the importance and nature of
the hearsay rule, saying "the court is not inclined to extend the
exceptions further than they have already been carried." See also
Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U. S. 412 (1836) at 435 to 437 for a further
illustration of the narrow limits of the early hearsay rule.
5 United States v. Westcoat, 49 F. (2d) 193, 195 (C.C.A. 4th, 1931); 5
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §§ -941, 1942. See Hearsay and
the English Evidence Act (1938) 34 ILL. L. REV. 974, 979.
6 The Spica, 289 Fed. 436, 443 (C.C.A. 2d, 1923) (Court also recog-
nized as a valid excuse for non-production of the declarant inability
to find one who could speak with personal knowledge) ; 5 WiGMORE,
EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §§ 1456, 1506, 1403, 1521, 1523.
7 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §§ 1456, 1506, 1406, 1408.
s The proofs of loss of postal matter required by the federal govern-
ment as a condition precedent to payment, and penalties imposed
by law for making false claims against the government and for
perjury, sufficiently insured trustworthiness in the instant case.
For a typical example of what will satisfy the requirement of
reliability. See Seals v. United States, 70 F. (2d) 519, 520 (C.C.A.
5th, 1934) (regular entries).
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hence justified admitting their statements under the necessity excep-
tion, 9 the court in the instant case relaxed the hearsay rule even fur-
ther.1° Moreover, it admitted evidence which did not fall within
any of the traditional exceptions."
The court's ruling was clearly in accord with modern criticisms
of the rule which have been levied by many legal scholars 12 and some
courts." One recent federal decision, similar to the principal case, also
suggests a tendency to break away from the traditional limitations of
the hearsay rule.'4 Some will not object to the admission of the evi-
dence on the peculiar facts of the instant litigation, but will decry the
tendency of the court.' Others will applaud the decision. 16
OThe court showed extraordinary realism, for it would have been
somewhat absurd to bring in the addressees or their depositions
to prove items of 76 cents and up, with only two over $30 and
two-thirds less than $10 each. Such a rule would have meant that
actual proof could not have been had, for 66 proofs of loss were
in evidence.
1o The court carefully pointed out that one reason it admitted the
evidence was that it established a prima facie case which the
plaintiff could rebutowith his own testimony, if he wished.
11 Although there was some guarantee of reliability, as pointed out in
note 8, supra, the proofs of loss which the affidavits represented
did not fall into any of the traditional categories, i. e. dying
declarations, statements against interest, declarations about family
history, etc. For a complete list of traditional exceptions, see 5
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, (3d ed. 1940) § 1426.
22 Callahan & Ferguson, Evidence and the New Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: H (1937) 47 YALE L. T. 194, 196; McCormick, Tomor-
'ow's Law of Evidence (1938) 24 A.B.A.3. 507; Wigmore Jury
Trial Rules of Evidence in the Next Century in LAW, A CENTURY
OF PROGRESS (1937) 347. Because of the expert character of the
fact-finders sitting on administrative tribunals, the case against
the hearsay rule in that area is much stronger. Consequently,
the hearsay rule has been greatly relaxed and sometimes abolished
in administrative proceedings. See Seymour, The Professor Solilo-
quizes on Fact-Finding Boards and the Rules of Evidence (1938)
24 A.B.A.J. 891. Moreover, with less civil litigation being dis-
posed of by jury trials, the need for the hearsay rule is lessened.
Clark & Shuiman, Jury Trial in Civil Cases (1934) 43 YALE L.J.
867, 870. See also CODE OF EVIDENCE (Am. Law Inst. 1941) draft
no. 4, rule 603 and 615, and introductory note to c. VII.
"3 Standard Oil Co. of N.Y. v. Johnson, 299 Fed. 93, 98 (C.C.A. 1st,
1924) ("the modern tendency is to increase the number" of ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule).
14United Fruit Co. v. United States, 33 F. (2d) 664 (C.C.A. 5th, 1929)(In an action by the government against a carrier for value of
stolen mails, court admitted in evidence files of postoffice depart-
ment showing verified claims made by senders of registered mail).
"S The court could perhaps have admitted the *evidence on the ground
that it fell within the recognized exception of official statements;
the necessity requirement is almost completely relaxed; expediency
is sufficient. But the court declined to follow this rationale. For
further discussion of this exception to the hearsay rule, see 5
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940), §§ 1630, 1631. See also United
States v. Westcoat, 49 F. (2d) 193 (C.C.A. 4th, 1931).
16 See the authorities cited in note 11 supra.
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